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Abstract. We propose a probabilistic contract signing protocol that achieves balance even in the
presence of an adversary that may delay messages sent over secure channels. To show that this property
holds in a computational setting, we first propose a probabilistic framework for protocol analysis, then
prove that in a symbolic setting the protocol satisfies a probabilistic alternating-time temporal formula
expressing balance, and finally establish a general result stating that the validity of formulas such as
our balance formula is preserved when passing from the symbolic to a computational setting. The key
idea of the protocol is to take a “gradual commitment” approach.
1 Introduction
Contract-signing protocols (CSPs), see, e. g., [BOGMR90,ASW98,GJM99], form a class of crypto-
graphic protocols with complex security goals, which require to explicitly reason about strategies of
the involved principals. To analyze CSPs, various techniques have been applied, including a special-
ized logic [BDD+06], alternating-time temporal logic [KR03,KR02] as well as abstract [KKW05]
and computational [CKW07] models. In this paper, we (i) present a new CSP of which we prove
that it achieves a central security goal (balance) in the presence of an adversary stronger than
the adversaries considered in prior work and (ii) propose a setting where probabilistic strategic
security properties of protocols can be transferred from a symbolic to a computational setting.
Recall that a CSP is a security protocol where two partners, Alice and Bob, attempt to sign a
contract over a network and that a central security requirement of CSPs is balance: No situation
should occur in which Bob has a strategy to resolve the protocol (obtain a contract), and another
strategy to abort the protocol (prevent Alice from ever obtaining a contract). Such a situation can
be used as an advantage in negotiations with a third party. It is known that to achieve balance
a trusted third party (TTP) is necessary [PG99], but such a party is also a potential bottleneck.
Therefore, a desirable property of CSPs is optimism: If Alice and Bob follow the protocol and no
network problems occur, the TTP should not be involved in the protocol run [ASW98]. Balanced
and optimistic CSPs have been proposed in the above mentioned papers [ASW98] and [GJM99].
These protocols, however, achieve balance only under the assumption that Bob has no way to
ensure that his message is the first to reach the TTP.
The first contribution of our paper is a protocol that achieves balance under the relaxed
assumption that Bob is allowed to arbitrarily delay messages between Alice and the TTP. Clearly,
we cannot allow that he prevents their delivery completely. We propose a parametrized protocol
that achieves the following probabilistic notion of balance under the above assumptions: The
(n + 1)-round version ensures that in any situation during a protocol run, if Bob has a strategy
to resolve the protocol with success probability pr, then he does not have an abort strategy with
success probability greater than 1+ 1n −pr. Note that for every reasonable protocol there is a state
in which the sum of these probabilities is 1, for example in a final state of the protocol run.
The second contribution of this paper is a formal framework in which one can prove security
properties of a subclass of probabilistic protocols. Our model is a symbolic model in the Dolev-
Yao style [DY83], but we also provide it with a computational semantics, based on [BR93]. We
explain how probabilistic alternating-time temporal formulas [AHK02,CL07] can be interpreted
with regard to both semantics, the symbolic and the computational one. Our main result is that
the validity of a certain class of formulas is preserved when passing from the symbolic to the
computational setting, that is, we show that the symbolic setting is computationally sound. Using
this and the fact that our protocol is balanced in the symbolic setting and balance can be phrased
in alternating-time temporal logic, we obtain that our protocol is balanced in the computational
setting (for a single session) as well.
Related Work. In [KKW05], a symbolic definition of balance for CPSs is introduced, and the
problem to decide whether a CSP is balanced is proved decidable. In [KKT07], decidability for
security properties specified in the µ-calculus (an extension of ATL) is proved. The notion of
balance was first defined in [CKS01]; in [CMSS05] an impossibility result concerning balance
was established. In [KR03] and [KR02], it was shown how ATL formulas can be used to specify
security properties for cryptographic protocols, in particular, CSPs were dealt with. [CKW07]
proposes a computational model for analyzing branching-time security properties, which includes
a computational definition of balance. Our treatment of strategies in the computational model
shares ideas with their use of schedulers. The first result proving that symbolic security transfers
to the computational model was obtained in [AR02]. Many generalizations for different kinds of
computational models followed (see, e.g., [CKKW06], [CH06], [LM05]).
Our protocol resembles the fair contract-signing protocol of Ben-Or et al. [BOGMR90]. In
both cases the signers exchange messages that give them increasing power to obtain a replacement
contract from the TTP. However, the behavior of the TTP is quite different: In our protocol, if
honest Alice gets a rejecting response from the TTP, she can be sure that the TTP will never
resolve a request of Bob. In the protocol from [BOGMR90], this is not the case; for instance, when
Alice sends the first message to Bob, she has no option to prevent him from trying to resolve the
contract at any later time. Thus the resulting state is neither timely nor balanced for Alice. In fact,
there are states reachable with non-negligible probability, in which Bob has both a certain strategy
to abort and a certain strategy to resolve the contract, so that the sum of the two probabilities
from above, pr + pa, is 2 in [BOGMR90] (as opposed to 1 + 1n as in our protocol).
2 The Gradual Commitment Protocol (GCP)
In this section, we present our contract signing protocol and state its key properties in an informal
fashion. The protocol is based on [Aiz08].
Recall that, informally, a contract signing protocol is unbalanced if in some situation the
dishonest party has both a strategy to abort the protocol run (prevent the honest party from
receiving a valid contract) and a strategy to resolve the protocol run (to receive a valid contract).
For a probabilistic setting, we define the following measure of degree of unbalance: the unbalance of
a state is at least ε if the dishonest party has a strategy that leads from the state to an abort with
probability εa and, in addition, a strategy that leads from the state to a resolve with probability
εr, and εa + εr ≥ 1 + ε. Observe that (i) for every reasonable protocol there is a state in which
a party has obtained a contract, which means the unbalance of such a state is at least 0, (ii) for
an unbalanced protocol without randomness there is a state and strategies such that εa = 1 and
εr = 1, that is, the unbalance is at least (and at most) 1. Our protocol is tailored to guarantee low
unbalance: In the version with parameter n the unbalance in any reachable state is not greater
than 1n .
The protocol is based on the idea of “gradual commitment”. The version with parameter n
proceeds in n+ 1 rounds and makes sure that the later the round is the higher is the probability
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to be able to resolve a protocol run, while, conversely, the lower is the probability to be able to
abort a protocol run. As a consequence, the unbalance is low in any state.
In an ordinary run of the protocol the contracting parties exchange 2n+2 commitments, which
we refer to by CMTiX for X ∈ {O,R} and i ∈ {1, . . . , n+1}. First, the originator, O, sends CMT1O,
then the responder, R, sends CMT1R, and so on, the last commitment being CMT
n+1
R . The pair of
the last two commitments, 〈CMTn+1O ,CMTn+1R 〉, is a valid contract. The commitments are defined
by
CMTiX = [text, sid, O,R, T, i]X ,
where text is the document the two parties want to sign, sid is a session identifier, O and R are
identifiers for the parties, T is an identifier for the trusted third party (TTP), which can resolve
conflicts, and i is the round number. The notation [·]X stands for a message and its signature.
A commitment CMTiO with i ∈ {1, . . . , n} can be used by R to form a resolve request, RRiR,
addressed to the TTP. Similarly, a commitment CMTiR can be used by O to form a resolve request,












for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In addition, there is one resolve request that O can always form (without having
received any commitment by R): RR0O = [CMT
1
O, abort]O, where abort is a fixed token.
Possible replies of T to m = RRiX are the replacement contract, denoted R-CTR
i
X , and defined
by R-CTRiX = [m]T , which is recognised as a valid contract, or a rejection, RT
i
X = [m, rejected]T ,
where rejected is a fixed token such as abort.
To formulate the rules by which T handles incoming resolve requests we define a relation < on
the resolve requests: RRiR < RR
j




R if i+ 1 < j. This implies that if m < m
′
and m is a resolve request by X, then m contains a weaker commitment of X than m′.
When T receives a message m = RRiX , it reacts according to the following:
1. If m is the first request, resolve m (i.e., send the replacement contract) with probability i/n
and reject (i.e., send a rejection) with probability (n− i)/n.
2. If any request by X was received before, ignore m.
3. If any request by X̄ was received before, say m′, then:
(a) If m′ was resolved, then resolve m.
(b) If m′ was rejected and m′ < m, then resolve m with probability i/n and reject with
probability (n− i)/n.
(c) If m′ was rejected and m′ 6< m, then reject m.
We will prove (see Theorem 8.3 and Corollary 8.5) that GCP is timely and its unbalance is 1/n,
even if the adversary may delay messages sent over the secure channel. We mention without proof
that, in addition, the protocol is TTP-accountable and TTP-secure, see [GJM99] for definitions.
3 The Symbolic Protocol Model
In this section we describe our symbolic protocol model, which the remainder of the paper is based
on.
3.1 Variables, Terms, and Messages
We fix a finite set Ids of identities and a number k of entities or roles that participate in a protocol
session. The adversary is denoted by A . For each identity A ∈ Ids ∪ {A }, and for each i ∈ N,
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there is a message nonce NA,im , and a randomization nonce N
A,i
r . We also fix a finite set Cons of
constants.
To allow syntactic checks on incoming terms, we use variables that have a type and a depth re-
striction. Let types be the finite set containing the elements id (identity), mnonce (message nonce),
rnonce (randomization nonce), pair (pair), const (constant), empty (empty), and sig (signature).
Let V be a finite set of variables, and let type : V → types and maxdepth : V → N be functions
assigning a type and a maximal depth to each variable.
Randomization nonces are used to explicitly capture randomness used by signature schemes.
Note that [CHW07] proves that for many cases, explicitly capturing randomness in the symbolic
model is not necessary. Their work, however, only covers trace properties, and protocols where
equality tests are not permitted. We define terms as usual, and define their type and depth in the
obvious way:
Definition 3.1 (terms, types, depth).
– The empty term ε is a term with depth(ε) = 0 and type(ε) = empty,
– an identity A ∈ Ids is a term with depth(A) = 0 and type(A) = id,
– a message nonce N is a term with depth(N) = 0 and type(N) = mnonce,
– a randomization nonce N is a term with depth(N) = 0 and type(N) = rnonce,
– a constant c ∈ Cons is a term with depth(c) = 0 and type(c) = const,
– if t1 and t2 are terms, then 〈t1, t2〉 is a term with depth(〈t1, t2〉) = max(depth(t1), depth(t2))+1
and type(〈t1, t2〉) = pair,
– if x ∈ V , then x is a term with depth(x) = 0 (and of type type(x)),
– if t′ is a term, A ∈ Ids is an identity, and N is a term with type(N) = rnonce, then sig(A,N, t′)
is a term with depth(sig(A,N, t′)) = depth(t′) + 1 and type(sig(A,N, t′)) = sig.
A message is a variable-free term. We denote the set of messages by M . A substitution is a partial
function σ : V → M . By dom(σ), we denote the domain of σ. We demand that dom(σ) is finite
for every substitution. For a term t and a substitution σ, by tσ we denote the term obtained from
t by replacing every variable x ∈ dom(σ) appearing in t with σ(x).
Definition 3.2 (matching substitution). For a term t, substitutions σ and σ′, and a mes-
sage m, we say that m matches with t and σ via σ′ if tσ′ = m, σ′(x) = σ(x) for every x ∈ dom(σ),
and type(x) = type(σ′(x)) as well as depth(σ′(x)) ≤ maxdepth(x) for every x ∈ dom(σ′).
We now define how the adversary can derive messages from its current knowledge. The following
definition captures that the adversary can perform the canonical operations on terms to construct
new messages. In order for our model to be computationally sound, we allow the adversary to
derive all possible constants (acknowledging that these might be hard-coded into an algorithm).
Although it would be compatible with usual security notions of signature schemes to allow the
adversary to learn the randomness used in the construction of a signature, we do not model this
explicitly—our protocols will ensure that if a random string is used for the construction of a
signature, then this string will not be used for any other purpose during a protocol run, hence
this knowledge would be of no use for the adversary: Instead of re-using a randomization received
in the protocol run, the adversary might as well use one of its own nonces, and achieve the same
effect.
Definition 3.3 (derivable messages). Let I be a set of messages and let C be a set of iden-
tities. The set d(I , C) (the messages derivable from I with corrupted C) is the smallest set
satisfying
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– Cons ∪I ∪ Ids ⊆ d(I , C),
– for all i ∈ N, NA ,im ∈ d(I , C),
– 〈t1, t2〉 ∈ d(I , C) if and only if t1, t2 ∈ d(I , C),
– if sig(A,N, t) ∈ d(I , C), then t ∈ d(I , C),
– if A ∈ C, t ∈ d(I , C), and i ∈ N, then sig(A,NA ,ir , t) ∈ d(I , C).
3.2 Protocols
We distinguish two types of protocol rules. A strategic rule is of the form r−→d s where r and s
are terms and d ∈ N∪ {A }. The meaning is that s is sent to d as a reply to r. A randomized rule
is of the form ε−→pd s where p is the probability of the rule.
A role Π = (V,E, v0, `) is a finite directed edge-labeled tree where (V,E) is a tree with root
v0 and ` is a labeling mapping every edge (v, v′) ∈ E to a protocol rule `(v, v′). The tree (V,E)
is the so-called role tree and its vertices are the (local) states of the role. We demand that every
variable occurring on the right-hand side of `(v, v′) occurs on the left-hand side of a label of an
edge on the path from v0 to v′. We additionally require that for a role Π, there is at most one
identity A such that a (message or randomization) nonce of the form NA,im or N
A,i
r appears in the
receive-send rules. We say that A is the identity of Π.
For technical reasons, we only allow randomized local states and strategic local states, defined
as follows. A randomized local state is a vertex v where (i) all outgoing edges are labeled with
probabilistic rules of the form ε−→pd s, (ii) the probabilities of the outgoing edges sum up to 1,
and (iii) all incoming edges are labeled with a strategic rule of the form r−→d ε. A strategic local
state is a state where the outgoing edges are all labeled with strategic rules.
We partition roles into network-accepting and network-ignoring roles: The former accept in-
coming messages from the network (i.e., the adversary), the latter ignore all incoming network
messages. (One could also express this property for each protocol rule individually, for ease of
notation we fix this behaviour for the entire role.)
A k-roles protocol is a tuple Pr = (Π1, . . . ,Πk,I0) where each Πi is a protocol role and I0 is
a finite set of messages, the initial adversary knowledge.
In order for protocols to be “realistic,” roles may only create their own signatures (but may
send signatures they have received earlier), and must use different randomization nonces when
signing different terms. The straight-forward formalizations of these requirements can be found in
Appendix A.
3.3 Symbolic Protocol Execution
We define how a protocol Pr = (Π1, . . . ,Πk,I0) is executed in our model. We first use renaming
to ensure that different roles use disjoint sets of variables and local states. In the following, we refer
to all of the involved labeling functions as ` (after renaming, the individual labelling functions
have disjoint domains). A global state of Pr is a tuple q = (a, σ, v1, . . . , vk,I , C,m), where a ∈
{1, . . . , k}∪{A ,S ,K } is the active role, σ is a substitution, vi is a local state of Πi, I is a set of
messages, C ⊆ Ids ∪ {A }, and m is a message. Here S represents the scheduler, who determines
the order of activation in a protocol run, and K denotes the key generator. For an identity a ∈ C,
we say that a is corrupted in q. The message m is currently waiting to be processed. With d(q)
we denote the set d(I , C).
We define a graph containing all global states of Pr. The initial state of Pr is
(K , ∅, v10, . . . , vk0 ,I0, {A } , ε), where vi0 is the root of Πi. For a state q = (a, σ, v1, . . . , vk,I , C,m),
its successor states are determined as follows:
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Key Generation and initialization. If q is the initial state, then there is a successor state
(A , ∅, v10, . . . , vk0 ,I0, {A } , ε),
Corruption of identities. If a = A and C = {A }, then for every set C ′ ⊆ Ids, q has a successor
state (S , ∅, v10, . . . , vk0 ,I0, C ′, ε). These are the only successor states of q.
This expresses that after key generation, the adversary may corrupt identities, but may not
perform another action without the scheduler being active before.
Adversary send. Assume that a = A and m = ε. Let m′ ∈ d(q) be a message, and let i ≤ k
such that Πi is network-accepting. Then there is a successor state (i, σ, v1, . . . , vk,I , C,m′).
The adversary can deliver the message m′ to any network-accepting role, which is activated
next.
Adversary receive. Assume that a = A , and m 6= ε. Then q has exactly one successor state,
namely (S , σ, v1, . . . , vk,I ∪ {m} , C, ε).
This models that when a principal sends a message over the network, the next step is to add
this message to the adversary knowledge. Before the adversary can perform any further action,
control is returned to the scheduler.
Principal receive and send. Assume that a = i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. For each suc-
cessor v′i of vi such that `(vi, v
′
i) contains the rule (r →d s) or r−→pd s, and there is
a substitution σ′ such that s matches with r and σ via σ′, there is a successor state
(d, σ′, v1, . . . , vi−1, v′i, vi+1, . . . , vk,I , C, sσ
′) of q, if d 6= A or sσ′ 6= ε. If d = A and sσ′ = ε or
if there is no v′i as above, q has a successor state (S , σ
′, v1, . . . , vk,I , C, ε).
This models that the receiver of a message sent by a role is activated next to process the
message. If the message is empty and addressed to the adversary, or if the receiver cannot
process the incoming message, control is returned to the scheduler (and m is ignored). Note
that if the rule is a randomized rule (i.e., of the form r−→pd s), then the matching-requirement
is fulfilled trivially, as by the protocol model, it follows that r = ε.
Activation scheduling. If a = S , then for all a′ ∈ {A } ∪ {1, . . . , k} there is a successor state
(a′, σ, v1, . . . , vk,I , C, ε). This models that the scheduler can activate any role at any time,
including the adversary.
The key generation step does not have a function in the symbolic protocol execution. We
include it here because in the later computational model such a step is obviously necessary. Note
that the above structure of the protocol execution allows certain “dead end loops:” When the
adversary delivers a message m to a role that cannot receive m in the current state (due to lack
of a matching receive-send rule), then the scheduler is activated next. The scheduler then can
activate the adversary again; this leads to an infinite cycle where essentially, nothing happens. We
therefore require the following: If the adversary did not produce any output that was received by
a principal (in the sense that the principal changed local state upon processing the adversary’s
message), then from the resulting state, the adversary may not be activated. (Formally, the states
are extended with a flag that indicates whether the adversary has delivered a “useless” message.
Since this flag is not used elsewhere, we do not make it explicit in our state description above).
Similarly, we disallow the scheduler to activate a principal machine with incoming message ε if
the principal in the current state does not have a ε−→d s-rule available (these rules are used to
explicitely express that a principal is ready to act without receiving an incoming message).
This requirement results in a certain fairness condition that the scheduler needs to satisfy (see
remarks at the end of Section 5.2).
The above definition of protocols and protocol execution allows principals to send messages
directly to other principals, and ignore messages delivered by the adversary. Hence one could avoid
many security problems in protocols by simply letting all communication use these direct links,
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completely disabling the adversary from taking any relevant action in a protocol run. However,
such a protocol is clearly unrealistic. The reason why we allow these direct links is the observation
that many security goals cannot be achieved when no guarantees can be made about the delivery
of messages. An example is optimistic contract signing, which cannot be realized fairly without a
trusted third party [PG99], and obviously the adversary must not be able to circumvent delivery
of messages to the trusted third party completely. This is not unrealistic: Such a party might be
reachable via telephone, papermail or other fallback methods in the case of a network problem
(where of course, message delivery might take a long time).
The most realistic way to express this situation in our model is to introduce a special party
which only serves as a “buffer” between other principals and the secure channel, and whose only
function is to relay received messages to the TTP. Hence all other honest players will be able to
directly send messages to the buffer, which may directly send messages to TTP. Since we model
the buffer as a principal on its own, we can express statements about strategies of buffers. Hence
we can use pATL∗-formulas to talk about the possibly allowed behaviour of these parties in detail,
rather than fixing the way these channels work once and for all in our model. By using different
specifications for these “buffer principals,” one can also specify whether messages may be delivered
out of sequence, and other details. Note that for a realistic protocol model, these channels should
be specified such that when receiving an incoming term, they do not immediately forward it to the
intended recipient, but use a r →A r-rule to add the received term to the adversary’s knowledge,
and return control to the scheduler (if one wants to model buffers that conceal messages from the
adversary, one can use a r →A ε instruction instead, whose only result is storing the incoming
message and activating the scheduler). Delivery-actions then should be ε-transitions, which can
be initiated by the buffer-principal whenever it is activated by the scheduler.
However, our model also allows to specify (somewhat unrealistic) protocols where the principals
can perform long sequences of distributed actions using their direct connections, without the
adversary or the scheduler being able to interfere. The degree of “realism” of a security property
proved in our model depends on the assumptions that the protocol makes about the communication
model (i.e., the usage of direct links): A direct link used in the symbolic protocol description results
in a shared tape between the corresponding machines in the symbolic model that the principals
use to exchange their messages. For an example, of a protocol expressed in our model and the
security guarantees obtained, see Sections 4 and 8.
Observe that the above list only fixes the set of possible successor states, and does not state
which of the available successor states is entered in an actual protocol run. The semantics of
probabilistic protocol execution are defined by the game structure induced by a protocol, see
Section 5.2.
4 Modeling the Gradual Commitment Protocol
We now specify GCP, informally described in Section 2, within the framework developed thus
far. There are two different scenarios in which we study the protocol, namely the one where the
originator is honest while the responder is not and the one where the originator is dishonest while
the responder is not. Both are very similar; we only model the first one.
Parameters and Basic Terms. The set of identities and the set of constants are defined by
Ids = {O,R, T} , Cons = {text, abort, rejected, 1, . . . , n+ 1} .
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Here, the constants of the form i model the round numbers. The variables are denoted by x, y,
and z, possibly decorated with sub and superscripts. The initial adversary knowledge, I0, is the
empty set. Formally, the randomization nonces are of the form Na,ir . For notational convenience,
we denote them by L, M , and N , possibly decorated with sub and superscripts. It will be obvious
which role the nonces belong to.
All together there are 4 roles:
– role 1 is the originator, (by abuse of notation) also denoted by O,
– role 2 is the trusted third party, also denoted by T ,
– role 3 is a buffer for a message from the originator to the TTP, denoted BTO, and
– role 4 is a buffer for a message from the TTP to the originator, denoted BOT .
All roles except for the buffers are network-accepting, the buffers are network-ignoring. The
buffers are symmetric; we describe only BTO. Its role tree (VB, EB) is given by VB = {b0, b1, b2}
and EB = {(b0, b1), (b1, b2)}, and the labeling function is defined by
l(b0, b1) = x−→
A
ε , l(b1, b2) = ε−→
T
x .
Hence buffers do not deliver messages immediately, but only when then are activated (by the
scheduler). Also, the adversary can read messages sent via buffers, but since they are network-
ignoring, cannot write onto them. The terms that we use in our formal description are very similar
to the description in Section 2, except for the following changes: (i) tuples are replaced by nested
pairing, (ii) session id’s are not modeled because we analyze a single session, and (iii) randomization
nonces are made explicit. We let, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
CMTiX = sig(O, x
i
X , 〈text, 〈X, 〈R, 〈T, i〉〉〉〉) , RR0O = sig(O, y0O, 〈CMT1O, abort〉) ,
RRjO = sig(O, y
j
O, 〈CMTj+1O ,CMTjR〉) , RRjR = sig(O, yjR, 〈CMTjO,CMTjR〉) .
Formal Model of the Originator. The underlying tree, (VO, EO), is defined by
VO = {s1, . . . , sn+3, r2, . . . , rn+2, a2, . . . , an+2, c2, . . . , cn+2} ,
EO = {(si, si+1) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 3} ∪ {(si, ri), (ri, ci), (ri, ai) : 2 ≤ i ≤ n+ 2} .
So s1 is the root of the tree. The labeling is defined in what follows, where the first three equations
describe how the originator works if nothing goes wrong:














l(sn+2, sn+3) = CMTn+1R −→A ε ,




















O ]−→A ε ,
l(rk, ak) = sig(T, zk−2O , 〈RRk−2O , rejected〉)[yk−2O /Mk−20 ]−→A ε ,
where i ∈ {2, . . . , n+ 1}, j ∈ {3, . . . , n+ 2}, and k ∈ {2, . . . , n+ 3}. The notation [x/N ] indicates
a substitution which replaces all occurrences of x by N .
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Formal Model of the TTP. We define the role of the TTP by induction on the structure of its
role tree. The meta variable X stands for R or O. In some rules, a message will be sent to BXT . If
X = R, then BXT = A , because we model the dishonest responder by the adversary. The empty
sequence is the root of the tree. For every pair (i,X), the root ε has one successor, (i,X), which
itself has two successors, (i,X, res) and (i,X, rej), with edge labeling defined by
l(ε, (i,X)) = RRiX −→
T
ε ,














sig(T, LiX , 〈RRiX , rejected〉)[yiX/M iX ] .
A vertex of the form (i,X, res) has n + 1 successors, namely (i,X, res, j) for j ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1},
and the labeling of the corresponding edges is given by










/M jX ] .
A vertex of the form (i,X, rej) has, for every j such that i < j ≤ n and X = R, or i+1 < j ≤ n and
X = O, one successor of the form (i,X, rej, j), which, in turn, has two successors, (i,X, rej, j, res)
and (i,X, rej, j, rej), where the labelings are determined by:














/M jX ] ,










/M jX ] .
Further, for every j such that j ≤ i and X = R, or j ≤ i + 1 and X = O, the vertex has the
successor (i,X, rej, j, rej):










/M jX ] .
Intuitively, if the TTP is in a state (i,X, rej, j, res), this means that the first resolve request
that T received was RRiX , and was rejected. The second resolve request was RR
j
X̄
, and was resolved.
Note that there is no need to make X̄ explicit in the notation, as by construction, T only receives
one request from each X and X̄. Prefixes of (i,X, rej, j, res) correspond to states in which only
a subset of the above-mentioned events have occured, variations of exchanging rej and res have
their natural interpretation.
5 Probabilistic ATL and GS
We now define the logical framework in which we analyze security properties of cryptographic
protocols. We use alternating-time temporal logic (ATL∗), as introduced in [AHK02], extended
with probabilistic operators as considered in [CL07].
A probabilistic function f : A → B is a function that for each element a ∈ A returns a prob-
ability distribution on B. We often simply write f(a) for the result of the random experiment of
choosing an element b from B, each with the probability (f(a))(b).
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5.1 Game Structures and Strategies
Definition 5.1 (probabilistic game structure). A probabilistic game structure (PGS) is a
6-tuple G = (PR, Q,∆, δ,Π, PV ) where
– PR is a finite set of principals,
– Q is a (possibly infinite) set of states,
– PV is a finite set of propositional variables,
– Π : PV → 2Q is a propositional truth assignment,
– ∆ is a move function assigning to each state q and principal a ∈ PR a set ∆(q, a) of moves,
– δ is a probabilistic transition function.
It is required that for each q ∈ Q there is at most one principal a ∈ PR with ∆(q, a) 6= ∅. This
unique principal a is called the principal in q and denoted with Pr(q). The transition function
must be such that δ(q,m) ∈ Q for all q ∈ Q and m ∈ ∆(q, Pr(q)). For each q and m the support
of δ(q,m), i.e., the set {q′ ∈ Q | prob(δ(q,m) = q′) > 0}, must be finite.
For a set A ⊆ PR, let A = PR \ A. We say that a state q is final if Pr(q) is undefined, i.e.,
∆(q, a) = ∅ for all a ∈ PR.
Definition 5.2 (strategies). Let G = (PR, Q,∆, δ,Π, PV ) be a GS.
1. A strategy for a principal a ∈ PR is a function s such that for all q ∈ Q, if Pr(q) = a, then
s(q) ∈ ∆(q, a).
2. A strategy for A ⊆ PR is a set SA = {sa | a ∈ A} such that for each a ∈ A, sa is a strategy
for a.
Note that strategies depend on the state only, and not on the history of the computation.
History-aware strategies can be defined analogously. For our application in the setting of cryp-
tographic protocols, our definitions ensure that all relevant aspects of the history can be derived
from the state, hence for ease of notation we only consider “memoryless” strategies.
Let SPR = {Sa | a ∈ PR} be a strategy for PR, and let P = p0p1p2 . . . be a path, i.e., a






prob(δ(pi, sPr(pi)) = pi+1)
)
,
i.e., the probability that when the principals follow their strategies from SPR, the resulting play
follows the path P . With P [i] for i ≥ 0 we denote the ith state on P . With P [i,∞] we denote the
sub-path of P starting at P [i].
Next, we define the set of pATL∗-formulas. Our syntax and semantics are almost identical to
the ones used in [CL07].
Definition 5.3 (probabilistic alternating-time temporal formulas).
– Each propositional variable p ∈ PV is a state formula.
– If ϕ,ψ are state formulas, then so are ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ∨ ψ and ¬ϕ.
– If A ⊆ PR, α ∈ [0, 1], and ϕ is a path formula, then 〈〈A〉〉≥αϕ, 〈〈A〉〉≤αϕ, [[A]]≥αϕ, and
[[A]]≤αϕ are state formulas.
– Every state formula is a path formula.
– If ϕ,ψ are path formulas, then so are ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ∨ ψ, and ¬ϕ.
– If ϕ and ψ are path formulas, then ϕUψ and ϕRψ are path formulas.
A pATL∗-formula is a state formula, unless explicitly specified otherwise.
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The semantics of pATL∗-formulas is given in the next definition.
Definition 5.4 (semantics of logic). Let G = (PR, Q,∆, δ,Π, PV ) be a GS.
– For a variable p ∈ PV , G , q |= p if and only if q ∈ Π(p).
– Boolean connectives are treated as usual.
– Let A ⊆ PR and α ∈ [0, 1]. Then
• G , q |= 〈〈A〉〉≥αϕ if there is a strategy SA for A such that for all strategies SA for A,∑
G ,P |=ϕ,P [0]=q probSA∪SA(P ) ≥ α, (≤ α analogously)
• G , q |= [[A]]≥αϕ if for all strategies SA for A, there is a strategy SA for A such that∑
G ,P |=ϕ,P [0]=q probSA∪SA(P ) ≥ α, (≤ α analogously)
– For a path P and a state formula ϕ, G , P |= ϕ if G , P [0] |= ϕ.
– For a path P and path formulas ϕ, ψ, we have G , P |= ϕUψ if there is some i ≥ 0 such that
(i) G , P [i,∞] |= ψ, and (ii) for all 0 ≤ j < i, we have that G , P [j,∞] |= ϕ.
– for a path P and path formulas ϕ, ψ, we have G , P |= ϕRψ if for all i ≥ 0, we have
(i) G , P [i,∞] |= ψ, or (ii) there is some j ≤ i such that G , P [j,∞] |= ϕ.
The abbreviations ♦ϕ for trueUϕ (“ϕ is true eventually”) and ϕ for ¬♦¬ϕ (“ϕ is always true”)
are often used. In the above definition, the (possibly uncountable) sums
∑
G ,P |=ϕ probSA∪SA(P )
can be rewritten as sums over countably many elements (there can only be a countable number
of paths with a non-zero probability). Hence the value of the sums is well-defined. Note that by
construction, ¬〈〈A〉〉≥α¬ϕ is equivalent to [[A]]≥1−αϕ, and 〈〈A〉〉≤αϕ is equivalent to 〈〈A〉〉≥1−α¬ϕ.
Analogously, U is the dual operator of R.
We now consider a formula of the form [[A]]≥αϕ. Using the same proof as in [Kuh53] (see also
[BL69]), one can show that
1. The “game” in which the coalition A tries to lower the probability of ϕ below α (and hence the
coalition A attempting to ensure the probability is at least α) is determined: When [[A]]≥αϕ
is satisfied (i.e., A cannot “win” the game), then 〈〈A〉〉≥α is satisfied (i.e., A has a strategy
to “win”). Hence [[A]]≥αϕ implies 〈〈A〉〉≥αϕ. Since the other direction is trivial, the formulas
are equivalent (this equivalence is already mentioned for sequential, non-randomized game
structures in [AHK02]).
2. The optimal strategies in the above game are pure, i.e., not randomized.
The second point above shows that our restriction to determined strategies can be made
without loss of generality; the first point shows that in our formulas, we can avoid the [[.]]-operator.
We say that a formula is in [[.]]-free positive normal form if no [[.]]-operator appears, negation
only appears directly before propositional variables, and no 〈〈.〉〉≤α-operator appears. Using the
above-mentioned dualities and the usual one between the Boolean operators ∧ and ∨, we conclude:
Proposition 5.5. Every pATL∗-formula is equivalent to an pATL∗-formula in [[.]]-free positive
normal form.
5.2 Game Structures for Protocol Analysis
We now define the PGS canonically induced by a protocol and our symbolic protocol model. This
PGS canonically represents the states and actions described in Section 3.3. Note that instead
of introducing a principal for the key generator in the GS, we let the scheduler perform the
corresponding move (obviously, this does not change the strategies present in the structure).
13
Definition 5.6 (protocol game structure). Let Pr = (Π1, . . . ,Πk,I0) be a protocol. The
probabilistic game structure (PGS) for Pr is GPr = (PR, Q,∆, δ,Π, PV ) where
– PR = {1, . . . , k,A ,S },
– Q is the set of global states of Pr,
– the set of moves is as below,
– for each local state v of a rule in Π1, . . . ,Πk there is a propositional variable xv, for each
principal a ∈ Ids there is a variable ca, and for each d ∈ {1, . . . , k,S ,A } there is a variable
ad.
– for a variable xv, Π(xv) is the set of all global states in which the (uniquely determined) role
containing the state v is in the state v; for a variable ca, Π(ca) contains all states in which a
is corrupted; and for a variable ad, Π(ad) contains all states q with Pr(q) = d.
For a state q = (a, σ, v1, . . . , vk,I , C), Pr(q) = a, this principal’s moves and consequences of the
moves are defined exactly as in the execution of a symbolic protocol, except for the following cases:
1. If a ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and its current local state is randomized. In this case:
– the principal a has a single move available in q,
– the outcome of q specified by δ results from choosing each possible successor state with the
corresponding probability from the protocol description
2. If a = K , then let Pr(q) = S , and there is exactly one available move, which results in the
state (A , ∅, r1, . . . , rk,I0, {A } , ε).
With q0Pr, we denote the initial state of Pr in GPr. A pATL
∗-formula for Pr is a pATL∗-formula
using only principals and propositional variables present in GPr. Also note that we do not make
any explicit requirements about “fairness” of scheduling: Fairness requirements may be specified
by the pATL∗-formula defining the security requirements of the protocol. For an example of how
to treat fairless, see our formal definition of symbolical unbalance in Section 8.
However, the model does demand a minimal amount of “fair scheduling” of the scheduler:
A principal for a protocol role Πi that is in a local state where it expects to either receive a
message (from the network or directly with a direct connection), or can act without receiving
a message (this is modeled by a rule with an empty incoming term in the role definition), then
during the protocol run, if no message is delivered to the principal, the scheduler eventually has to
activete the principal (without an incoming message). This requirement is inherent in the model,
as by construction, the scheduler is not allowed to activate the adversary twice in a row when
the protocol execution has not progressed in the first activation (i.e., no principal changed local
state). Hence if the role Πi never receives an incoming message, there is a point when there is
no other option for the scheduler than to activate the role Πi (note that our protocols allow only
finitely many steps). Thus a principal will not remain in a state forever, when in that state he
has an outgoing edge labeled with a protocol rule that has an incoming empty term. Similarly,
from our model it follows immediately that the scheduler needs to activate the adversary when
other principals “run out of actions,” using the aA -variable, it is possible to demand additional
properties of A -activation in the formulas.
From the protocol model it follows that in a final state of GPr (i.e., a state in which none of
the players has an available action), no principal is waiting for an incoming term that is derivable
by the adversary, and no principal is in a current local state in which it can act without input
from the adversary (i.e., with a protocol rule where the incoming term is ε).
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6 The Computational Model
We now explain our computational model, which is based on standard cryptographic models
as [BR93]. Our main addition is to reason about strategies explicitely. With a computational
strategy we mean an algorithm that, given information about the current state, determines the
next move of the principal. Our principals access a strategy machine which is a strategy in the above
sense. The adversary is an algorithm which includes its strategy as well as any attacks it might
use against the signature scheme. Since strategies are polynomial-time computable functions, we
fix the set of relevant strategies (Turing machines) before a protocol run—quantifying over Turing
machines during a protocol execution would allow the machines to non-uniformly depend on the
security parameter: A machine chosen in an protocol run with security paramater η could have
a hard-coded table of prime factorizations of all integers with bitlength up to η, compromising
the security of signature schemes relying on the hardness of the factorization problem. Hence
we demand that a strategy must be “successful” for every security parameter. This is a natural
assumption, and one that is used (with respect to the adversary) in virtually all definitions of
security of computational realizations of cryptographic primitives. The set of strategies (and the
strategies themselves) naturally may depend on the security criterion that a protocol is supposed
to satisfy, i.e., on the pATL∗-formula ϕ under consideration. Also, an adversary typically is a
specific algorithm “breaking” a specific security feature of a protocol. Hence the adversary may
depend on the formula ϕ as well.
For executing a protocol, the machines use a signature scheme that consists of a triple of
algorithms:
– a key generator keygen, which on input (1η, r) (where η is the security parameter and r is a
sequence of bits, interpreted as a random bitstring) produces a pair of public and secret keys,
– a signature algorithm sign, which on input (s, r, sk) (where s is a bitstring, r is a sequence of
bits, and sk is a secret key) returns a bitstring t,
– a verification algorithm verify, which on input (s, t, pk) (where s and t are bitstrings and pk is
a public key) produces as output a single bit.
These algorithms operate in the expected manner, details see Appendix B.
We now define how protocols are executed in a computational model. The machines in the
computational model share tapes to enable direct communication. For the computational execution
of a protocol Pr = (Π1, . . . ,Πk,I0), the following Turing machines are present in the system, and
each pair of machines shares a tape:
Principal machines. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, a machine Mi, which simulates the role Πi.
It parses incoming messages and computes responses according to the protocol description in
the obvious way. Messages adressed to another principal are written on the shared tape for the
corresponding principal, messages to be sent to the adversary are written on the tape shared with
A . A machine simulating a network-ignoring role ignores all messages received on the tape shared
with the adversary machine. To resolve strategic choices, a principal machine may communicate
with its strategy machine (see below). In a randomized local state, the principal chooses each of the
possible actions with the probability according to the protocol description (recall that randomized
states only have outgoing edges in which no term is received, hence all of the successor edges in
the protocol role can be performed). In randomized local states, a machine simulating a protocol
rule does not activate its strategy machine. In both cases, the adversary is informed of the move
executed by the principal machine (i.e., A receives an input specifying the current vertex in
the protocol description that the principal machine now is in). In order to create and verify
signatures, the principal machines use the algorithms from the computational signature scheme
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in the obvious way. More details on the (straight-forward) way in which these machines operate
are given in Appendix C. After the principal machine performed its computation, the machine
representing the receiver of the outgoing message is activated next, unless the message is empty
and the recepient is the adversary, in which case the scheduler is activated.
Scheduler machine. A scheduler machine S , which plays the same role as the symbolic sched-
uler: It may activate machines for principals as well as the adversary machine.
Adversary machine. An adversary machine A . This machine can perform any probabilistic
polynomial-time computation, and in each activation, either process an incoming message (if there
is an unread message on one of its incoming tapes), or write a bitstring to a single incoming tape
of another machine (if there is no incoming message currently). If the adversary produces output
to another machine, this machine is activated next. Otherwise, the scheduler machine is activated.
Additionally, at the beginning of the protocol run the adversary machine can be called with a
special parameter which leads to the printing of the list of identities that A wants to corrupt on a
special output tape (the adversary does not have write access to any shared tapes with principal
machines in this step).
Strategy machines. For each a ∈ {1, . . . , k,S }, a machine M sa deciding which action the corre-
sponding principal performs. These machines have access to the entire configuration of the com-
putational system, i.e., to the configuration of all involved Turing machines as well as randomness
used so far in the protocol run. Strategy machines operate as follows: Whenever the principal a is
active and has more than one possible action, the machine operating the role of A sends a symbol ?
to its corresponding strategy machine, which is then activated. The strategy machine then replies
with a number uniquely identifying the move. The communication between the principal machine
for a and its strategy machine happens using a shared tape, i.e., the adversary may not interfere
with this communication. Strategy machines are not activated by the scheduler, but only used by
principals during their activation.
In the same way as in the symbolic model, if the adversary delivered a message to a principal
machine that the latter did not accept (i.e., the machine did not change local state), the scheduler
may not activate the adversary again in the following step, but has to activate a principal machine.
Note that the assumption that strategy machines have complete information about the current
computational state and that the adversary is informed of internal decisions of the principals is re-
quired to transfer symbolic strategies to the computational model—see the Conclusion (Section 9)
for a discussion of these issues.
6.1 Computational Protocol Execution
A computational protocol run is described by the following experiment, where, as usual, η denotes
the security parameter and 1η is the input to the experiment.
1. Key Generation and machine initialization. For each identity a ∈ Ids, start keygen on input
1η, store the secret key in ska and the public key in pka. Initialize machines for every role
1, . . . , k, A , and S , and strategy machines for each role 1, . . . , k and S . Each machine gets
access to all public keys, the private key of the identity of the corresponding role (for machines
simulating a protocol principal), and to the security parameter 1η. The machines may only
perform local computations in this step.
2. Corruption. The adversary prints a set C of identities and receives the private key of all a ∈ C.
3. Protocol Run. The scheduler S is activated, and may activate principals or the adversary, ac-
cording to the protocol description. After the adversary terminates, the scheduler may continue
to activate principals (note that there is only a finite number of actions that can be performed
after the adversary stops, hence the experiment will terminate).
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It is clear that the experiment runs in polynomial time. A step in the computational run of the
protocol is the action of one of the principal machines, the scheduler machine, or the adversary (a
step may involve communication with a strategy machine). The first step is key generation and
initialization, the next one is the corruption step, after which the scheduler machine controls the
next activation. A computational state q of Pr consists of the configurations of all involved Turing
machines in the computational execution of a protocol directly before the execution of a step
(i.e., no machine is currently running), plus an indicator for the next machine to be activated (a
principal machine, the scheduler, or the adversary), plus the so-far used random bits. An identity
is corrupted in q if in the corruption phase of a protocol run leading up to q, the adversary printed
a list C containing the corresponding identity. Note that the security parameter and the set of
corrupted identities can be derived from the current state and the specification of the adversary
machine. With C ηPr, we denote the computational system running with security parameter η. With
qηinit, we describe the initial state of C
η
Pr. We do not make the machine A explicit in the notation,
as it will always be clear from the context: Note that the adversary machine is never changed
during a protocol run.
To model that principals may change their strategy during a protocol run, we allow the set of
running strategy machines to change during the execution of the protocol. By this we mean to
replace, in the current global configuration of the computational system, the configuration of the
currently active strategy machine with the initial configuration of the new strategy machine (note
that strategy machines have access to the local configuration of all running Turing machines in the
system, hence it is not necessary to give the newly introduced machine access to the configuration
of its predecessor).
A computational path of Pr is a sequence Pc of computational states. For a computational state
qc, a set SA of strategy machines for all principals in {1, . . . , k,S } and a pATL∗-formula ϕ, with
probqc,SA,ϕ(Pc), we denote the probability that the computation follows the path Pc, when the
strategy machines SA are used and the formula ϕ is given to the adversary as input (see below).
6.2 ATL Semantics in the Computational Model
We now define what it means for a protocol to “computationally satisfy” a pATL∗-formula. A
strategy set fixes the strategies used by the involved principals to achieve certain security goals.
Definition 6.1 (strategy set). Let ϕ be a pATL∗-formula in [[.]]-free positive normal form. A
strategy set for ϕ is a pair (A , S) consisting of an adversary A and a function S such that, for
each subformula ψ = 〈〈A〉〉≥αχ and each a ∈ {1, . . . , k,S }, S(a, ψ) is a strategy machine for a.
We often write S(ψ) for the set {S(a, ψ) | a ∈ {1, . . . , k,S }}. We now define what it means
for a pATL∗-formula to be computationally satisfied by a protocol and a pre-selected strategy set.
The question which strategies will be executed in a protocol run will be addressed below. Due to
Proposition 5.5, it suffices to define satisfaction for formulas in [[.]]-free positive normal form.
The following definition is straight-forward, except for the case ψ = 〈〈A〉〉≥αχ. In this case,
the principals in A “switch” to their strategy machines that are specified by the strategy set for
achieving the formula ψ. Additionally, the adversary gets “informed” of the current security goal
that is to be reached (i.e., the adversary is handed ψ as input). In the case that A ∈ A, this is
necessary, since we want to evaluate the adversary’s strategy to achieve the formula ψ, hence we
need to make sure that the adversary indeed follows that strategy. In the case that A /∈ A, this
models the usual assumption in pATL∗, that if a coalition A works to achieve some goal, then the
remainder of the players tries to achieve the opposite (and hence needs to be aware of the goal
attempted by A).
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Definition 6.2 (computational pATL∗ semantics). Let Pr be a k-roles protocol, let ϕ be a
pATL∗-formula for Pr in [[.]]-free positive normal form, let St = (A , S) be a strategy set for ϕ, let
qc be a computational state of Pr, let Pc be a computational path of Pr, and let ψ be a subformula
of ϕ.
– If ψ = ai for a variable ai, then C
η
Pr, St, qc |= ψ, iff in qc, the principal i is activated next.
– If ψ = ca for a variable ci, then C
η
Pr, St, qc |= ψ, iff a is corrupted in q.
– If ψ = xv, for a variable xv, then C
η
Pr, St, qc |= ψ, iff in qc, the simulation of the protocol rule
containing the state v is in the local state v.
– Boolean connectives are dealt with as usual.






– If ψ is a state formula, then C ηPr, St, Pc |= ψ iff C ηPr, St, Pc[0] |= ψ.
– If ψ = χUφ, then C ηPr, St, Pc |= ψ iff there is some i ≥ 0 such that C ηPr, St, Pc[i,∞] |= φ and
C ηPr, St, Pc[j,∞] |= χ for all 0 ≤ j < i.
– If ψ = χRφ, then C ηPr, St, Pc |= ϕ, v iff for all i ≥ 0 C ηPr, St, Pc[i,∞] |= φ, or C ηPr, St, Pc[j,∞] |=
χ for some j ≤ i.
We now define which strategy machines will be running in the execution of a protocol. The
quantification here canonically mirrors first-order logic, with the simplification that our strategies
do not need to depend on strategies that previously were executed in the protocol run so far.
Let ϕ be a pATL∗-formula for a protocol Pr, and let ψ = 〈〈A〉〉≥αχ be a subformula of ϕ. We
say a principal i ∈ {1, . . . , k,S } is universally quantified (existentially quantified) in ψ, if i /∈ A
(i ∈ A). A strategy enumeration fixes the values for the quantified strategies in a formula. We
consider the existentially quantified and universally quantified principals separately.
Definition 6.3 (strategy enumeration). Let ϕ be a pATL∗-formula. A universal (existential)
strategy enumeration for ϕ is a function f such that for each pair (ψ, i) where ψ is a subformula
of ϕ such that i is universally (existentially) quantified in ψ, f(ψ, i) is a strategy machine for i.
For a pair of universal and existential strategy enumerations and an adversary A , the strategy
set running in the system is the pair (A , U ∪ E) (note that U and E have disjoint domains).
7 Computational Soundness
Our intention is to prove that the computational model satisfies the same formulas as the symbolic
one. However, in the computational model we cannot completely rule out that the adversary
might “break” the protocol, since with some (low) probability, signatures may be forged, random
numbers selected by different parties may coincide, etc. Therefore we consider “relaxed” versions
of the involved pATL∗-formulas in the computational setting.
Definition 7.1 (ε-tolerant formulas). Let ϕ be a pATL∗-formula in [[.]]-free positive normal
form and let ε > 0. Then ϕε, the ε-tolerant version of ϕ, is obtained from ϕ by replacing, in each
outermost 〈〈.〉〉-operator, every occurrence of a probability bound α with α− ε.
Another difference between the symbolic and computational model is that the symbolic model
allows quantification over strategies “during a protocol execution,” which as explained earlier leads
to problems in the computational model. Hence we fix the set of available strategies before the
protocol is actually run. The existential and universal quantification over strategies now become
quantifications over strategy enumerations, and the quantification happens before a protocol run.
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A special role is played by the adversary: Recall that we only consider a single adversary machine,
which does not change during a protocol run. We therefore disallow formulas to quantify the
adversary both existentially and universally—this is a natural requirement, as a security property
is usually phrased in describing what the adversary can or cannot do. Formally, a pATL∗-formula
for Pr in [[.]]-free positive normal is A -positive (A -negative), if for all subformulas 〈〈A〉〉≥αχ, we
have A ∈ A (A /∈ A). A formula is A -monotone if it is A -positive or A -negative. We only consider
security properties defined by A -monotone formulas. Note that in [KKT07], similarly defined
monotone formulas are studied to obtain a decidability result. Except for the aforementioned
differences, both models satisfy the same formulas:
Theorem 7.2 (computational soundness). Assume that the signature scheme is resistant
against existential forgery. Let Pr be a protocol, and let ϕ be an A -positive (A -negative) pATL∗-
formula such that GPr, q0Pr |= ϕ. Then there exists an existential strategy enumeration E and an
adversary machine A (for all adversary machines A ) such that for every universal strategy enu-
meration U, if St = (A , E ∪ U), then there is a negligible function ε : N → R+ such that for all
security parameters η, C ηPr, St, q
η
init |= ϕε(η).
The theorem states that for any security goal satisfied in the symbolic model, there are strategy
machines achieving the goal in the computational model: One can implement algorithms for the
protocol roles such that when given a “command” to achieve a specific protocol situation, they can
compute the corresponding actions (in this case the “command” is the subformula stating the goal
to be reached). See Section 8 for an application of Theorem 7.2 in the context of contract signing
protocols, and an example of the guarantees that the theorem gives for executing a protocol in
the computational model.
The remainder of Section 7 is dedicated to proving Theorem 7.2: In Section 7.1, we establish
a canonical correspondance between symbolic and computational states, Section 7.2 then proves
Theorem 7.2.
7.1 Relating Computational and Symbolic States
We now define a correspondance between computational and symbolical states. In the following,
let qc be a computational state. Note that randomization is only used by the principals when
determining the values of (message and randomization) nonces, and when choosing a move in a
randomized local state. Additionally, the adversary and the key generator make use of randomness.
To define the symbolic state corresponding to qc, we first define a symbolic representation of each
bitstring message present in the state. This representation is defined analogously to the parsing of
messages (see Appendix C), we only note the non-trivial cases. In order to simplify the definitions,
we assume that before the protocol run is started, the adversary randomly chooses values for
the (message and randomization) nonces it will use in the protocol run, and when constructing
bitstrings to send to principals during the protocol execution, the adversary only chooses nonces
from this list and nonces that it received from the principals during the protocol execution. Since we
only study a single session of a protocol in which each term that can be accepted by a principal has
bounded length, there is only a finite number of nonces that the adversary can use in the creation
of messages, and a bound on this number can be computed based on the protocol description
alone. Hence the above assumption on the adversary can be made without loss of generality. We
now define the symbolic representation of messages, where we only cover the non-trivial cases (the
others are dealt with in a straight-forward manner, analogous to the definition of matching in
Appendix C). In the following, let mc be a message present in the system (i.e., a sub-message of
a bitstring message accepted or written by a principal in the protocol run so far).
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– If mc is a nonce (nonce, s), then since s appears in a message present in qc, and we assumed
that the adversary and all principals determine random values for all nonces at the beginning
of the protocol run, the value s appears in a principal’s or the adversary’s list of nonce values.
1. If s is the value chosen by the machine simulating the role i with identity A for the nonce
NA,im , then symb(mc) = N
A,i
m .
2. Otherwise, due to the above, s appears as the i-th message nonce in the list of nonces
created by the adversary. In this case, let symb(m) = NA ,im .
In the above case distinction, if more than one case applies, then choose a representation using
some well-defined order on the principals. Note that this case only occurs when different nonces
chosen by principals have the same value. This event occurs only with negligible probability
in the security parameter.
– If mc is of the form (sig,m′c, s, k), then let A be an identity with public key k. Assume that
verify(s,m′c, k) = 1. If mc was obtained by a call of sign, then let N be the symbol representing
the randomization nonce used in that call. Otherwise, let N be a symbol for an adversary
randomization nonce. In both cases, let symb(mc) = sig(a,N, symb(m′c)). Again, if there is
more than one nonce N satisfying the condition, choose one according to some arbitrary order.
In the above, whenever none of the mentioned cases applies, the value symb(mc) is undefined
(note that such a term is never accecpted by a principal, as due to our protocols not using encryp-
tion, principals are able to scan the entire incoming messages before processing it, see Appendix C
for the straight-forward details). Note that we do not define a symbolical term corresponding to a
randomization nonce—by the definition of protocols, a randomization nonce is never received or
sent as a message on its own, but only used in combination with a signature. We now can define
the symbolic state corresponding to qc as the state symb(qc) = (a, σs, v1, . . . , vk,I , C,m), where
– a is the principal marked for activation in qc,
– σs is the substitution defined as σs(x) = symb(σc(x)), where σc denotes the union of sub-
stitutions maintained by the computational principal machines (note that these have disjoint
domains, and symb(.) is defined for every term that has been received by a principal),
– for i = 1, . . . , k, vi is the local symbolic state of the role Πi as simulated by the principal
machine,
– I contains, for every message mc written to the adversary’s incoming tape during the protocol
run so far, the term symb(mc) (again note that these are all well-defined, since the messages
mc have been sent by principals),
– m = symb(mc), where mc is the bitstring produced as output by the adversary or principal
which was last activated (note that by definition, a principal only writes to a single output
tape during its activation). If symb(mc) is not defined, then for m we choose a special garbage
symbol that is not used anywhere else and does not match with any variable (formally, we
extend the set of types with a garbage type that is used nowhere else, and principals may not
use variables of this type. We do not formalize this further—note that symb(mc) can only be
undefined if mc is not accepted by any principal machine).
For a computational path Pc = qc1 . . . , q
c
n, we define the corresponding symbolic path symb(Pc)
as symb(qc1) . . . symb(q
c
n). We are interested in paths resulting from computational runs of the
protocol. In order to relate protocol runs in the computational and symbolic models, we first show
that with overwhelming probability, a run in the former is also possible in the latter.
Definition 7.3. Let Pr be a protocol, ϕ an A -monotone pATL∗-formula for Pr, let (A , S) be
a strategy set for ϕ, let η be a security parameter, and let r be a sequence of random bits of
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length required in protocol run with security parameter η. Then trc(Pr, η, r, (A , S)) is the sequence
of global computational states in the experiment run of Protocol Pr with adversary A , strategy
machines as specified by S, and random coins r.
We say that a trace trc(Pr, η, r, (A ,S)) = (q1c , . . . , q
n
c ) is symbolically valid if
symb(q1c ) . . . symb(q
n
c ) is a valid path in GPr, i.e., for all i < n, there is a move m for Pr(symb(q
i
c))
such that prob(δ(symb(qic),m) = symb(q
i+1
c )) > 0. The following theorem is a key step in relating
the symbolic and computational models; as it ensures that traces of computational protocol runs
are symbolically valid with overwhelming probability.
Theorem 7.4. Let Pr be a protocol, ϕ an A -monotone pATL∗-formula for Pr, and let (A .S)
be a strategy set for ϕ. Then the probability that trc(Pr, η, r, (A ,S)) is not symbolically valid is
negligible in η, when r is chosen uniformly at random among all bit sequences of the corresponding
length, and the signature scheme is resistant against existential forgery.
Proof. By construction, the bitlength of all message and randomization nonces is at least linear in
the security parameter. Therefore, the probability that two nonces generated by different principals
coincide is negligible in the security parameter. For the remainder of the proof, we therefore only
consider protocol runs in which such a collision does not occur. In particular, this implies that
each nonce has been generated by a well-defined principal (which might be the adversary).
From the construction of the computational and symbolic protocol executions, it is obvious
that all actions performed in the computational system can also be performed in the symbolic
system, as long as the computational adversary only produces messages representing symbolical
terms that are derivable in the current state. It therefore remains to show that with overwhelming
probability, the adversary only generates such bitstring messages.
Assume that this is not the case, and A constructs a message mc in a state qc such that mc is
accepted by a principal, and m = symb(mc) /∈ d(symb(qc)) with non-negligible probability. Since
in our model, every subterm of a term t can be derived from t, We can assume that m is minimal
(i.e., every proper subterm of m is derivable in the state symb(qc)). It thus follows that m is either
a nonce or a signature. If m is a nonce, then, since m /∈ d(symb(qc)), it follows that all tapes that
the adversary can read only contain bitstrings that are independant of the value of m. Hence the
adversary did not obtain m from a principal-sent message, and thus m is a nonce produced by
the adversary himself. This is a contradiction, since by the above assumptions values of nonces do
not collide, and thus m is an adversary nonce (and hence derivable). Therefore, m is a signature,
m = sig(A,N,m′) for some derivable message m′, an identity A, and a randomization nonce N .
We make a case distinction.
N is an adversary nonce. Since we assumed that collision of nonce values does not occur, and
since principals always use self-generated randomization nonces in the computation of signatures,
it follows that the signature has been computed by the adversary. Since m /∈ d(symb(qc)), and
m′ ∈ d(symb(qc)), we know that A is not corrupted in symb(qc), otherwise m would be derivable.
Since A is not corrupted in symb(qc), by construction of the experiment it follows that A does
not have access to the secret key of A in the computational run of the experiment. By definition
of symb(m), we know that mc contains a signature for m′ that is accepted by the algorithm verify.
Hence, in producing the message mc, the adversary has successfully performed an existential
forgery, which only occurs with negligible probability.
N is a principal nonce. Since we assumed that m is not derivable by the adversary, and we do not
use encryption in the protocols, it follows that the adversary does not have access to a bitstring
21
that contains a value depending on N . Due to the definition of the signature schemes, different
randomization nonces lead to different signatures. Since the length of randomization nonces is
at least linear in the security parameter, the probability that the adversary produces the same
signature as the one resulting from using N is negligible in the security parameter. This concludes
the proof of the theorem.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 7.2
We now show Theorem 7.2.
Proof. As explained in Section 7.1, we can assume without loss of generality that upon initializa-
tion, the adversary machine A generates the nonces it uses in the protocol run. By construction,
principal machines do the same. We now define the computational realization of a symbolic strat-
egy. Let sa be a symbolic strategy for a ∈ {1, . . . , k,S ,A }. Then the computational realization
of sa is an algorithm that in every computational state qc, determines the corresponding symbolic
state q = symb(qc), and then performs the computational move corresponding to sA (q) (this can
be computed from the symbolic move in a straight-forward way). Note that both the adversary
and the strategy machines have enough information during every stage of the protocol run to
determine the current symbolic state. Since the adversary can (see Section 7.1) be assumed to
use only a finite set of nonces and all terms have bounded depth, the appearing adversary and
principal strategies are finite and hence can be encoded in a polynomial time Turing machine (it
is obvious that during a protocol run, principals only need to distinguish whether two occurrances
of nonces contain the same value or not, the concrete value of the random bitstring in the nonces
is irrelevant).
Hence, for a subformula 〈〈A〉〉≥αψ of ϕ and a symbolic state q such that GPr, q |= 〈〈A〉〉≥αψ,
we fix a strategy SA for A that is “successful,” and hard-code the strategies for the principals in A
into the strategy machines and the adversary (note that if A ∈ A, then ϕ is A -positive). Let Ma,qϕ
be the resulting strategy machines. Let Ma,q be arbitrary syntactically correct strategy machines
for the remaining combinations of a and q. We define the existential strategy enumeration E as
follows: On input (a, 〈〈A〉〉≥αψ), it returns a strategy machine which, when the first state in which
it is activated is the state q, from then on simulates the strategy machine Ma,qϕ . If ϕ is A -positive,
then let A be the adversary machine that, when given the input ψ in a state qc corresponding
to a symbolic state q, executes the above-mentioned hard-coded symbolic strategies successful for
ψ in the state q. It follows that when performing the experiment with the strategy set obtained
from E, U , and A , the existentially quantified principals always perform the symbolic strategies
that are “successful” in the corresponding symbolic state.
In the case that ϕ is A -negative, we replace the machine A with a machine A ′ that performs
the same operations as A , except that when A produces a bitstring message corresponding to
a term that it cannot derive symbolically, A ′ stops. Due to Theorem 7.4, A and A ′ behave
identically with all but negligible probability. Let symb be the event that A does not behave
differently from A ′, and no nonces collide, let symb be the event that symb does not occur. If symb
occurs, then the relationship between symbolic and computational states defined in Appendix C is
always unique: When a principal sends a message containing a bitstring value chosen for the nonce
Na,im , this string will not be interpreted as a different symbolical nonce N
b,j
m for b 6= a or j 6= i.
Since the length of nonces is chosen linearly in the security parameter, the collision probability of
nonces is negligible. This and Theorem 7.4 implies that there is a negligible function ε such that
the probability of symb in an experiment with security parameter η is at least 1− ε(η).
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We claim that under the condition symb, the probabilities of the formulas satisfied in the
symbolic model exactly translate to the computational model. More formally, let C ηPr
′ be the
transition system obtained from C ηPr by replacing A with A
′, and allowing only protocol runs in
which the generated nonces do not collide. Then in C ηPr
′, the event symb always occurs.
Let UA be the universal strategy enumeration U when ϕ is A-positive, and let UA be the set
containing be the universal strategy enumeration U and the adversary A when ϕ is A -negative.
Let S(UA ) be the strategy set (A , E ∪ U). We now show:
1. Let qc be a computational state, let q = symb(qc) be the corresponding symbolic state, and let
ψ be a subformula of ϕ. Then the following are equivalent: (a) for all UA , C ηPr
′
, S(U), qc |= ψ
(b) GPr, q |= ψ.
2. Let Pc be a computational path, let P = symb(Pc), and let ψ be a subformula of ϕ. Then the
following are equivalent: (a) for all UA , C ηPr
′
, S, Pc |= ψ (b) GPr, P |= ψ.
Proof. We show both claims by induction. For point 1, if ψ is a propositional variable or a negation
of one, the claim follows directly from the definition of truth for propositional variables in GPr and
C ηPr. Induction for Boolean conjunction and disjunction is trivial.
Now assume that ψ = 〈〈A〉〉≥αχ. First assume that GPr, q |= ψ. Due to the construction of the
machines operating the principals in A, in the resulting protocol run the principals in A perform
the strategies SA where sA is a strategy for A that is “successful” against every strategy for sA in
the symbolic game structure. Since we only consider the conditioned experiment with condition
symb, the adversary only performs symbolically valid moves. Note that since no symbolic state is
visited twice during a protocol run, we can assume the adversary strategy to be deterministic (since
the adversary might as well fix the random bits it is going to use in the protocol run in advance).
Since we assumed that nonces do not collide, and different randomization nonces lead to different
signatures, the function symb(.) constructed in Section 7.1 is a one-to-one correspondance between
symbolical terms and their representation. Hence the matchings performed by the principals are
exactly those that result in the symbolic protocol structure when the corresponding strategies are
played. Also, the only relevant probabilistic events are the randomized choices by principals in
their randomized local states. Let SA be the symbolical strategies followed by the principals in A
(the adversary follows a symbolical strategy due to the above, and the principal machines only
make symbolically valid moves due to definition, hence such a strategy SA exists). Then for a path
P , we have probSPR(P ) =
∑
{Pc | symb(Pc)=P} probq,SA,ϕ(Pc), i.e., the probability that a symbolical
path P is followed in the symbolical model is the same as the probability that a computational
path corresponding to P is followed in the computational model. By choice of SA, the probability
that a resulting path satisfies χ is at most α. By induction, a computational path Pc satisfies χ if
and only if symb(Pc) satisfies χ. It therefore follows that the probability that χ is satisfied on the
resulting path is the same in the symbolical and computational models, the claim follows. Now
assume that GPr, q |= ψ is not true. Then for every strategy for A, there is a strategy sA for A
such that the probability of the resulting path satisfying χ is less than α. In particular, this is
true for the strategies selected by E. Let UA be the universal strategy enumeration containing
these strategies (in the case that ϕ is a A -negative formula, this contains the adversary strategy
contained in sA). Then in the exact same way as the above direction, it follows that the strategy
set obtained from S, A , and UA successfully ensures that the probability of the resulting path
satisfying χ is less than α, and thus (for all U , C ηPr
′
, S(U), qc |= ψ) is not satisfied.
Point 2 now follows trivially: The case where ψ is a state formula is covered by the above,
induction for propositional disjunction and conjunction is trivial. The case for operators U and R
also follows by straight-forward induction.
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We now show the statement of the theorem: We first show that if ψ = 〈〈A〉〉≥αχ is a subformula
of ϕ such that GPr, q0 |= ψ, then C ηPr, S, qηinit |= 〈〈A〉〉≥α−ε(η)χ. Let sA be the “successful” symbolic
strategies followed by the principals in A when supplied with the formula ψ in qηinit. Let sat be
the event that the resulting computational path satisfies ψ. From the above claim, it follows that
prob(sat | symb) ≥ α. Since prob(symb) ≥ 1− ε(η), it follows that prob(sat∩ symb) ≥ α · (1− ε(η)).
Hence we have prob(sat) ≥ prob(sat ∩ symb) ≥ α(1− ε(η)) ≥ α− ε(η), as claimed.
Note that ϕε(η) is obtained from formulas like the above with Boolean conjunction and disjunc-
tion. Hence the statement of the theorem follows by straight-forward induction on these operators.
8 Application to Contract Signing and the Gradual Commitment Protocol
In the following, let Pr be a contract-signing protocol with same structure as GCP, i.e., the roles
in the protocol are an originator O, a responder R, a trusted third party T , and buffer principals
B (for simplification, we treat the buffers as a single principal). All of these roles are operated
by different identities, i.e., they do not share signature keys or access to nonces. For analysing
the protocol, we treat one of the signers O and R as dishonest. Formally, this means we choose
X ∈ {O,R} as honest, and denote the dishonest signer as X. Since we assume that X works
together with the adversary, for the analysis we treat Pr as a 3-roles protocol: The honest signer
X, the trusted third party T , and a buffer principal B relaying messages from X to T and vice
versa. The role B is assumed to be network-ignoring, i.e., only X and T have write access to the
buffer. In the following, we use X,T , and B as principals in the protocol instead of numbers. Note
that in the game structure for Pr, in addition to the above-mentioned roles, there are principals
A and S . The first move of the adversary is to corrupt X, to be able to generate messages signed
by X in the protocol run.
We now define pATL∗-formulas describing the relevant security properties. ϕnc = cX ∧ cT
expresses that the adversary corrupted neither X not T .
We further assume that from the local states of X, T , and B, it can be derived whether X
(i.e., the adversary) or X have obtained a valid contract, and other facts about the protocol run:
Let ϕA c be a propositional formula that is true exactly in all states in which the adversary has
obtained a valid contract, let ϕXc be a corresponding formula for X, and let ϕdl be a formula that
is true exactly in those states where B has delivered all messages that it received.
We can now formally state the goals the adversary is trying to reach. Consider ϕabr defined by
ϕabr =  (ϕnc ∧ ♦ϕdl ∧ ¬ϕXc). This formula describes all protocol runs in which X and T never
get corrupted, every request written into a buffer principal is eventually delivered, and X never
obtains a contract. The formula for resolving the protocol is ϕres = ϕnc ∧ ϕdl ∧ ϕA c, i.e., a state
is resolved if the adversary has a contract, all buffers have delivered all messages, and neither X
nor T have been corrupted.
We can now formally state what it means for a protocol to be unbalanced:
Definition 8.1 (balance). A contract signing protocol Pr is symbolically (pa, pr)-unbalanced
against X, if there is some p > 0 such that
GPr, q
0
Pr |= 〈〈A , T, B,X,S 〉〉≥p♦
(〈〈A ,S , B〉〉≥pa♦ϕabr ∧ 〈〈A ,S , B〉〉≥pr♦ϕres) .
Recall from Section 5.2 that even though the scheduler works together with the adversary,
our protocol model requires that whenever the honest principal X is in a state in which he can
act without receiving an incoming message, then eventually the scheduler must activate X. As
an example, in the protocol GCP, if X does not receive the next commitment from X (i.e.,
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the adversary), then X eventually is allowed to send a resolve-request. In the following, with
“unbalanced” we mean “unbalanced for R or O,” and use “balanced” for “not unbalanced.”
An additional property of CSPs is the following: A protocol is timely, if the honest signer always
has a strategy that finishes the protocol run, i.e., reaches a state in which the honest principal
has a contract, or the adversary will never obtain a contract. We let ϕXabr = ¬ϕA c, expressing
a successful “abort” from the honest signer’s point of view (the adversary will never be able to
obtain a contract in the following protocol run), and stipulate:
Definition 8.2 (timeliness). A contract signing protocol Pr is timely if its initial state satisfies
the formula
[[A , T, B,X,S ]]≥1〈〈X〉〉≥1 ((♦ϕdl ∧ ϕnc)→ ♦(ϕXc ∨ ϕXabr)) .
The formula expresses that for every possible behavior of the principals, in every state that is
reached in the protocol run the honest signer has a strategy to finish the protocol run in the above
sense (provided that the buffer principals eventually deliver their messages, and neither X not
T are corrupted). Note that the [[.]]-free positive normal form equivalent of the above formula is
A -negative.
Our main result on GCP is:
Theorem 8.3 (balance and timeliness of GCP). For all n ≥ 2, GCPn is timely and (pa, pr)-
balanced for all pa + pr ≥ 1 + (1/n).
The proof can be found in Appendix D.
As an illustration of the guarantees that our soundness result obtaines for CSPs in the com-
putational model, consider the following: A computational definition of balance has been given
in [CKW07]. Adepted to the setting with explicit probabilities, their definition states1 that a
protocol is computationally (pa, pr)-unbalanced against X, if there is an adversary A, a strategy
machine SB for B, a strategy machine SS for S , a set of strategy machines S1 for {T,X} such
that for all sets of strategy machines S2 for {T,X} the following experiment, on input 1η, returns
1 with non-negligible probability:
1. (Key Generation) Generate keys for all involved identities.
2. (Corruption) The adversary prints a list of identities and receives their private keys,
3. (Reach unbalanced state) Simulate the protocol execution with A and strategy machines SB,
S1, and SS until the adversary prints unbalanced on a special tape,
4. (Verify unbalancedness) Start two copies of the experiment with A , strategy machines SB, S2,
and SS starting in the current state:
(a) All strategy machines and the adversary get abort as input. The sub-experiment is suc-
cessful, if from here, the probability that the contract signing is aborted is at least pa.
(b) All strategy machines and the adversary get resolve as input. The sub-experiment is
successful, if from here, the probability that the contract signing is resolved is at least pr.
The entire experiment is successful if and only if both sub-experiments are successful.
Here the signing is aborted (resolved) if X did not receive a contract (A did receive a contract),
the protocol is in a final state, and neither X not T have been corrupted. One can easily show
that their definition exactly corresponds to the guarantees implied by our symbolic definition of
balance above—with Theorem 7.2, we obtain the following corollary:
1 Note that we sligtly simplified their definition in omitting their polynomial-time “challenge”-function and fair
scheduling—since as explained earlier, our model is essentially finite-state in the symbolic setting, it is clear that
this function can be computed in polynomial time in our setting. Also, as mentioned earlier, fairness of scheduling
is implicit in our model—hence we can regard the scheduler as working together with the adversary.
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Corollary 8.4. A contract signing protocol is computationally (pa, pr)-unbalanced if and only if
it is symbolically (pa, pr)-unbalanced.
The easy proof can be found in Appendix E. For GCP, we conclude
Corollary 8.5. If pa + pr ≥ 1 + (1/n), GCPn is computationally (pa, pr)-balanced.
9 Conclusion
We have suggested an optimistic contract-signing protocol that remains balanced even when the
adversary has control over the order in which messages are received by the TTP. We note that by
replacing the randomized decision of the TTP with a strategic one, a protocol satisfying the usual
non-probabilistic defintion of balance can be obtained (although with the significant drawback
that the TTP is then behaving “strategically” which is an unnatural notion for a party which
is supposed to act as an “impartial judge”). We have introduced a formal model for analysis of
probabilistic protocols and proved its soundness with respect to computational security, implying
that our protocol is balanced in the sense of [CKW07].
An obvious question suggested by the current work is the extension of our results to additional
cryptographic primitives, most importantly encryption. Treating encryption requires different tech-
niques: A strategy in the symbolic model is simply a function from the set of states to the set of
possible moves, whereas encryption allows to hide information about the current state from the
principals and the adversary, leading to a game with incomplete information. Formally treating
incomplete information may also help in relaxing some of the conditions that we make in our
computational model: Currently, both the adversary and the strategy machines are given access
to enough information about the current state of the protocol run to determine in which “symbolic
state” the system is. This is obviously necessary to transfer strategies from the symbolic to the
computational model without significantly altering their success probability. In the current paper,
the assumption that the adversary knows the internal decisions of the principals is not unrealistic:
Since our model does not allow encryption, the adversary may read all network messages that the
principals send, and hence obtains significant information about the internal state of the princi-
pals from their I/O-behaviour. Obviously, the situation is different when we allow encryption in
cryptographic protocols.
Using a variant of ATL that allows to deal with incomplete information [JÅ06] therefore allows
us to both treat more cryptographic primitives as well as study a more realistic computational
model.
Also, contract signing in a concurrent model gives rise to interesting challenges [KKW06]. We
believe that the challenges in a concurrent model and one with incomplete information are closely
related.
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A Protocol Requirements
We require k-protocols to fulfill the following conditions in order to be implementable in polynomial
time: First, we restrict the way in which randomization nonces may be used: For a variable x or a
nonce N with type rnonce, we require that if x or N appears in a subterm of the form sig(A, x, t) or
sig(A,N, t), then all occurrances of x or N are of this form, with the same subterm t and identity
A. Additionally, terms with type rnonce are only allowed to appear as the corresponding argument
of a signature operator. This models that random strings for constructing signatures are not used
for any other purpose, but a signature received or sent once may be referred to in later steps of the
protocol execution. Note that this does not prevent the principal from signing the same message
more than once, with different randomization each time. Additionally, for a subterm sig(A, x, t) or
sig(A,N, t) in a role Π, if A is not the identity of the role Π, we require that the first occurance
of this subterm is on the left-hand side of a rule. This expresses that principals cannot generate
signatures for others, but of course have access to signatures received previously. We also require
that if a rule r−→d s or r−→pd s appears in one of the Πi where d ∈ N, then 1 ≤ d ≤ k, i.e.,
messages are only adressed to existing roles. Finally, in a protocol we require that different roles
(even when they have the same identities) use disjoint sets of nonces (this models that processes
running in parallel on the same machine should not use the same randomness).
B Signature Schemes
In the computational model, the signature scheme from the symbolic model has to be instanciated
with a computational signature scheme, consisting of
– a key generator keygen, which on input (1η, r) (where η is the security parameter and r is a
sequence of bits, interpreted as a random bitstring) produces a pair of public and secret keys,
– a signature algorithm sign, which on input (s, r, sk) (where s is a bitstring, r is a sequence of
bits, and sk is a secret key) returns a bitstring t,
– a verification algorithm verify, which on input (s, t, pk) (where s and t are bitstrings and pk is
a public key) produces as output a single bit.
We allow sign to report an error when supplied with a random string r that is longer than
required for the computation of the signature with the specified security parameter (which
without loss of generality can be derived from the keys). We require the length of accepted
random sequences to be at least linear in the security parameter. We demand that for all
pairs (pk, sk) returned by keygen on input 1η, all bitstrings s, and all sequences of bits r,
verify(s, sign(s, r, sk), pk) = 1, unless the call of sign reports an error. We also require that if
r1 6= r2, then sign(s, r1, sk) 6= (s, r2, sk) for every bitstring s and secret key sk, if both runs of the
signature algorithm are successful. All of the algorithms above are required to be deterministic
polynomial time (as the randomness is explicitely handed to the algorithms as the bitstring r).
An adversary against a signature scheme is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A which
as input receives 1η and a public key as computed by keygen on input (1η, r) for some random string
r of appropiate length, and has access to a signature oracle, to which it may send strings s and
receive valid signatures corresponding to the public key. The goal of the adversary is to produce
a signature which was not obtained from the oracle, and which is accepted by the verification
algorithm.
A signature scheme is resistant against existential forgery if for any adversary, the success
probability of A is negligible in η, provived that the string r is chosen uniformly at random.
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Often, a weaker notion of security is considered in which the adversary is only successful when
it constructs a signature for a message for which it did not obtain a signature from the oracle,
i.e., often it is assumed that when the adversary has access to a signature s for a message m,
it may generate bitstrings s′ 6= s which are also valid signatures for m. It is easy to see that if
the signature scheme allows these computations, we need to add a rule allowing the adversary to
derive sig(A,N2, t) from sig(A,N1, t), if the adversary can derive the randomization nonce N2.
The (straight-forward) generalization of the above to the situation in which the adversary
attacks more than one key can be found in [KSW08].
C Details on Operation of Principal Machines
We now describe the imlementation of the principal machines in detail. Upon initialization, a
principal machine chooses random values for all (message and randomization) nonces it will use in
the protocol run. The random bitstrings used for the message nonces have length η, the random
bitstrings for randomization nonces have the number of bits that the signature scheme requires
for the corresponding security parameter for randomization nonces. In the initialization phase,
the principal machine is given access to (binary representations of) all constants, identities, and
public keys. A principal machine keeps copies of all bitstring messages received and sent. When
encoding a message to be sent as a bitstring, we use tagging in order to let the message contain
complete type information: A message nonce is represented as a pair (nonce, s), where s is the
actual random string, a pair is represented as a triple (pair,m1,m2) where m1 and m2 are the
representations of components of the paired message, a constant is of the form (constant, c) where
c is the bitstring representation of the constant, (id, p) represents the encoding of an identity
where p is a string uniquely describing an identity, and finally a signature is represented with
a quadruple (sig,m, s, k), where m is the message, s the signature (i.e., the return value of the
signature algorithm), and k is a binary representation of the public key which can be used to verify
the signature. A principal expects incoming messages to be fully typed in the same manner, and
ignores all bitstrings which do not follow this convention. Note that since we do not use encryption
in our protocols, a principal can scan the entire incoming message to perform this verification,
also a principal is able to determine the depth of any subterm of a received message immediately.
We define the depth of a bitstring message mc in the obvious way.
A principal machine maintains, besides a “current state” in the form of a pointer to a vertex in
the tree describing the role it simulates, a “local” substitution σ mapping variables to bitstrings.
Since different protocol rules use different variables, we also use σ for the union of these local
substitutions. By constuction, a principal will only have to evaluate or modify σ for its own vari-
ables. When receiving an incoming bitstring message mc, a principal machine parses the message
by recursively trying to determine a matching against a term r on the left-hand side of a principal
rule as follows. Before applying any of the above rules, the principal scans the incoming message
for syntactical correctness and validity of all included signatures (see the case sig(A,N, r′) below
for details on signature verification).
– Assume that r is a variable x. If σ(x) is defined, then matching is successful if and only if
σ(x) = mc. If σ(x) is undefined, then check whether mc is of the correct type, and depth(mc) ≤
maxdepth(x). If this is not true, reject. Otherwise, matching is successful, and the substitution
σ is extended with σ(x) = mc.
– Assume that r is a pair 〈r1, r2〉. If mc is not of the form (pair,m1c ,m2c) for bitstring messages
m1c and m
2
c , then reject. Otherwise, recursively match m
1




– Assume that r is a constant c. If mc is not of the form (constant, c′), reject. Otherwise,
matching is successful if and only if c′ is identical to the value that was provided for the
constant c in the intialization. The case where r denotes an identity works in exactly the same
way.
– Assume that r is a signature sig(A,N, r′) for a term r′, an identity A, and a nonce N . If this
exact term has been processed as either a send- or a receive action in a previous step of the
protocol execution, accept if and only if the value of mc is the same binary string as the value
stored as the bitstring representation of r in the previous step. Otherwise, first check that mc
is of the form (sig,m′c, s, k), reject otherwise. Now first match m
′
c with r
′, and then accept if
verify(s,m′c, k) = 1, and k is the public key for A which the principal machine received in the
initialization phase (note that the principal does not assign a value to N—by construction of
protocols, the variable N is only used in the remainder of the protocol execution to access the
bitstring representation of mc, which the principal stores after matching is successful).
When a principal machine receives an input string mc, in the “local state” vi of the principal
role, with the above rules it determines the set of successors v′i such that `(vi, v
′
i) = (p, α, r →d s)
where mc and r match (plus the new substitutions in the case that this matching is applied). From
these possible edges, the machine then determines those with the lowest priority (i.e., with the
lowest number p in the value of `). If the current local state is not randomized, it sends a symbol
? to its strategy machine, receives a number identifying the successor node v′i, and then follows
the corresponding move. If the current local state is randomized, then each move according to a
successor node v′i is chosen with the probability associated with v
′
i. In both cases, the new local
state is the thus-determined v′i, the substitution σ is updated as described above. The adversary
receives a string indicating the new symbolic local state. The reply is computed in the obvious
way, where we note that the restrictions on the way in which signatures and randomization nonces
may appear in a protocol description (see Section 3.2) ensure that a principal can always compute
the bitstring representation of the outgoing term in polynomial time.
D Proof of Theorem 8.3
In this section, we show that our protocol GCP is in fact balanced and timely in the symbolic
model.
D.1 Unforgeability Lemma
The following lemma is an important tool in the proof—it states that at each point in the protocol
execution, the adversary cannot generate a resolve request that belongs to a future round. The
lemma is only phrased for the case where the originator is honest, but the symmetric variant holds
true as well.
Lemma D.1 (unforgeability). Let n ≥ 2 and q any reachable state in the GS model for GCPn
where R is dishonest such that si, ri, ai, or ci is the local state of the originator role and O /∈ C.
Then RRjR ∈ d(q) only if j < i.
The proof is a simple induction on the number of steps in a protocol execution. One uses that
every message of the form RRiO is a message signed by O, but O /∈ C, and Definition 3.3 only
allows to derive messages signed by O if O ∈ C or the message is sent to the adversary. The rest
follows from the structure of the protocol.
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D.2 Proof of Timeliness, Theorem 8.3
We start by showing that a reply of T to an honest X is final in the sense that the resulting state
is resolved or aborted for X. Assume that q is such a state and T has just replied to a request
RRiX of X. For instance, the local state of T in q could be (i,X, res).
If the reply of T was a replacement contract, we are done, because it is eventually delivered.
So for the rest assume that T sends a rejection token RTiX , which implies i < n.
The local state of T can be (i,X, rej) or (i, X̄, rej, j, rej).
First assume that X does not possess CMTn+1X in q.
The fact that T sends a rejection token as a reply to the above request means that the local
state of T is (i,X, rej) or (i, X̄, rej, j, rej). We proceed by a case distinction.
First case, the local state of T is (i, X̄, rej, j, rej). Then no replacement contract is ever sent
and because of i < n x never sends CMTn+1X . The state is aborted.
Second case, the local state of T is (i,X, rej). In particular, X does not possess a replacement
contract. Since X does not send a commitment such that X can construct a resolve request m
such that RRiX < m (unforgeability), T will not resolve any request by X. Therefore, the state is
aborted, too.
To show timeliness for any X-honestly reachable state q note that X always has a strategy to
receive a reply from T : Just send the most powerful request that it can generate to T and wait
for an answer. Since very message is eventually delivered, the above applies.
D.3 Proof of Balance
Let q be a reachable state and Ur and Ua the chances of X to resolve and abort the session in q
and U r and Ua the corresponding chances for X. Here, by the chance of X to reach ϕ we mean the
largest number p such that 〈〈X〉〉≥pϕ. (Note that this number exists, because our protocol model
is finite.) The goal is to show U r + Ua ≤ 1 + 1/n. To this end, we prove Ur + Ua ≥ 1 − 1/n by
constructing an appropriate strategy.
If T ’s local state in q is of the form (i,X) or a state in which T has already replied to some
request of X then by the proof of timeliness we know that this state is terminated for X, so that
Ur = 1 or Ua = 1.
In the following assume that T has not responded to any requests of X yet. Let S be a strategy
for X in which it sends the most powerful request m = RRiX that it can generate (if such a request
is already underway, do nothing). Let us evaluate the outcomes of S depending on q.
– If X possesses CMTn+1X in q then by timeliness q must be resolved for X, so that Ur = 1. In
the following cases assume that X does not possess CMTn+1X in q.
– Assume T has rejected a request of m′ of X before (i.e., the local state of T is a suffix of
(j,X, rej for some j), and m′ 6< m. In this case T will reply to m with a rejection token and
we have seen in the proof of timeliness that this indeed means that the session is aborted for
X. Thus Ua = 1 and we are done.
– Assume T has rejected a request m′ of X before and m′ < m. In this case, according to TTP
rule 4, Ur = i/n and Ua = 1− i/n, so that Ua + Ur = 1.
– Assume T has resolved a request m′ of X before. In this case T will resolve m as well, so that
Ur = 1.
– The only case left is that T has not replied to any messages from either X or X in q, so that it





q. We make a case distinction depending on which message first reaches the TTP. In all cases,
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let Pa(α) and Pr(α) be the probabilities that an aborted or a resolved states are reached. Let
us
• Assume the first message to reach the TTP is RRiO. Then Pr(α) = i/n and Pa(α) = 1−i/n.
• Assume the first message to reach the TTP is RRiR. Then again Pr(α) = i/n and Pa(α) =
1− i/n.
• Assume the first message to reach the TTP is RRi+1R . Then Pr(α) = (i+ 1)/n and Pa(α) =
1− (i+ 1)/n.
• Assume the first message to reach the TTP is RRjR with j < i. In this case α < m and thus
m is going to be treated according to TTP rule 3b when it arrives, thus Pr(α) = i/n and
Pa(α) = 1− i/n.
Hence in all cases, Pr(α) ≥ i/n. But this means Ur ≥ i/n. By the same argument Ua ≥
1− (i+ 1)/n, thus giving Ua + Ur ≥ 1− 1/n.
Note that due to Lemma D.1, the adversary cannot derive resolve requests for R with an index
of more that i + 1, hence the above list covers all possible messages to reach the TTP (note
that the honest originator O does only send a single resolve request, and then does not send
any more messages in the protocol run).
The case X = R and X = O is similar. The only difference is that valid requests of X = O
would be RRiO and RR
i−1
O .
E Proof of Corollary 8.4
The proof mainly is straight-forward translation between the semantics of the symbolic and the
computational models. We only highlight the non-trivial points:
Proof Sketch. A minor difference between our definition of computational unbalance above and
the computational interpretation of the pATL∗-formula defining unbalance is that in the compu-
tational definition, the adversary is required to recognize when it is in an unbalanced state. In our
setting, this difference is not significant: As argued earlier, our game structure is essentially finite,
and hence we can hard-code the information about which symbolical states are unbalanced into the
adversary algorithm (note that the adversary can always determine the current symbolic state).
In the following we use that implementations of finitely many different machines can naturally be
realized as a single machine simulating one of the machines depending on the input.
First assume that a protocol Pr is symbolically (pa, pr)-unbalanced.
Let ϕA = 〈〈A , B,S 〉〉≥pa♦ϕres, and ϕB = 〈〈A , B,S 〉〉≥pr♦ϕabr, and let ϕ =
〈〈A , T, B,X,S 〉〉≥p♦ (ϕA ∧ ϕB) Since Pr is symbolically (pa, pr)-unabalanced, it follows that
GPr, q
0
Pr |= ϕ. Since ϕ is A -positive, Theorem 7.2 implies that there is an adversary machine
Ac, and strategy machines Sϕ, Bϕ, BϕA , BϕB , SϕA , SϕB , Tϕ, and Xϕ (which we group as the
set S1) such that for all strategy machines TϕA , XϕA if the protocol is started with adversary Ac,
then a state is reached in which upon special input abort (which we interpret as ϕA), an aborted
state is reached with probability at least pa, and for all strategy machines TϕB , and XϕB , on input
resolve (interpreted as ϕB), a resolved state is reached. It is clear that this corresponds directly
to the computational definition.
Now assume that the protocol is not symbolically (pa, pr)-unbalanced. Then for every p ≥ 0,
the intial state q0Pr |= ϕ of GPr satisfies the formula ¬ϕ, which is A -negative.
Note that ¬ϕ = ¬〈〈A , T, B,X,S 〉〉≥p♦ (ϕA ∧ ϕB) is equivalent to 〈〈∅〉〉≥1−p¬♦ (ϕA ∧ ϕB).
Hence for every p, the empty coalition has a strategy to ensure that with probability at least 1−p,
no unbalanced state (meaning a state satisfying ϕA ∧ ϕB) is reached. Since the empty coalition
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has exactly a single strategy, the strategies for different values of p are the same. Since only
finitely many random choices occur during a protocol run, and each randomized choice only has
finitely many outcomes with non-zero probability, the occurring probabilities only take finitely
many values. Since the strategy of the empty coalition has a success probability arbitrarily close
to 1, its success probability is in fact 1. Due to Theorem 7.2, this implies that an unbalanced
state in the above sense is reached with probability ε(η) for a negligible function η only: For
every adversary machine, there are strategy machines for X and T that can stop the adversary
from reaching its goal with the specified probability, assuming they are provided with this goal
using the special input about and resolve. These machines straight-forwardly translate to
strategies for the formulas ϕA and ϕB in the symbolic definition (recall that existential quantifica-
tion in ϕ corresponds to universal quantification in ¬ϕ and vice versa). This concludes the proof. 
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